ResearchGate

See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/291837596

Democracy or Ideology

Article *in* boundary 2 · September 2006

DOI: 10.1215/01903659-2006-013

CITATIONS
2

READS
202

1 author:

R.A. Judy
University of Pittsburgh
36 PUBLICATIONS **257** CITATIONS

SEE PROFILE

All content following this page was uploaded by R.A. Judy on 26 October 2016.

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

Democracy or Ideology

Ronald AT. Judy

There is a significant resemblance between the Palestinian parliamentary election of 2006 and that of Algeria in 1992. In both instances, a populist Islamist party—Hamas in Palestine, FIS in Algeria—painstakingly over a period of years established its bona fides with a population chaffing under long regimes of government corruption and repression. This was done by establishing free health clinics, education and relief centers, and offering a conceptual framework within which that population can discover its historical function as an agency of change. Having earned populist credentials, in both instances, the Islamist party embraced the U.S. drive for establishing meaningful universal suffrage and democratic elections as a requisite for legitimacy, and won the majority in parliamentary elections without any signs of corruption or vote tampering. It is not just that liberalism has been hoisted on its own petard—I mean the anthropologically based political philosophy traceable from Hobbes, whom the neoconservatives have claimed in contradiction to Europe's Kantian soft power. Of course it has; there is no doubt of the popular consent articulated in the Palestinian and Algerian elections. Even more significant, however, is the way those

boundary 2 33:3 (2006) DOI 10.1215/01903659-2006-013 © Ronald AT. Judy

elections display vividly the constitutive struggle of their societies. These are societies characterized by an ever-widening gulf between what must be properly understood as a managerial elite securely attached to a global network of rule—although it is not fully integrated into that network—and a poverty-ridden population of the employed, barely employed, and unemployed who overwhelmingly inhabit the locale under management. There is little dispute that the Fatah-dominated Palestinian Authority and the FLN-dominated Algerian government mismanaged things nearly all along. This is a point on which the Western Left and Right eventually came to concur, and publicly so with the current U.S. administration's policy of forcing—including militarily—the establishment of democratic institutions in the region as the key to resolving the Palestinian problem. That policy provides the sounding board against which the statement of Hamas spokesman Farhat Asaad, uttered just days prior to the party exercising its democratically legitimated power to form a government, resounded: "First, I thank the United States that they have given us this weapon of democracy. But there is no way to retreat now. It's not possible for the U.S. and the world to turn its back on an elected democracy."[1]

The obvious sarcasm notwithstanding, Asaad's statement is remarkable as either astoundingly naïve or extremely shrewd. It may very well be naïve in its implied understanding of its object, the United States. After all, the U.S. presidential elections of 2000 and 2004, if nothing else, offer clear signs that this administration is, to paraphrase Alexander Hamilton, writing as Caesar in response to New York governor George Clinton as Cato, "not much attached to the *majesty of the multitude*, considering them in general very ill-qualified to judge for themselves what government will best suit their peculiar situations; nor is this to be wondered at. The science of government is not easily understood. 'Cato' will admit, I presume that men of good education and deep reflection, only, are judges of the form of a government."[2] It is of considerable moment that Hamilton's remarks were made during the debate in New York over ratification of the U.S. Constitution and that this particular rejoinder to Cato aims at challenging the overtly absolutist and so simplistic understanding of the motto "All power is seated in the people." Plainly put, while it is a requisite of legitimate power that it rule in

1. Steven Erlanger, "U.S. and Israelis Are Said to Talk of Hamas Ouster," *New York Times*, February 14, 2006, online edition, http://select.nytimes.com/search/restricted/article?res=F40814F6395A0C778DDDAB0894DE404482.

2. Alexander Hamilton, *The New York Daily Advertiser*, October 17, 1787, reprinted in *The Annals of America*, vol. 3 (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1976), 143.

the name of the people, with the expressed consent of the people, it is not only not requisite to be ruled by the people, but dangerous folly to do so. The presumption that the people must be led by reason and learning is founded on a pronounced understanding that society at large—of which the state is an aspect but not a plain reflection—consists of warring interests, each claiming its absolute truthfulness, and that if it should constitute a majority, tyranny will follow, as all other ways of being are crushed in the exercise of majority rule. Hamilton is quite emphatic that those who rally the people under the banner of their absolute sovereignty are deceitful and, in fact, are presenting their interest as universal, currying a false consciousness among the population. The proper course of power is to guide the multitude to a proper way of thinking in order to protect it from the extremism afield in its native intelligences. Here, the choice is between democracy as an instrument of the emendation of human intelligence, or ideology as an instrument of the preemption of that intelligence, except in narrowly sanctioned forms. So, if Asaad truly thinks that the U.S. administration policy of democratization either anticipates or welcomes a Hamas victory as the logical outcome of said policy, he is extremely naïve and, not to put too fine a point on it, historically ignorant.

On the other hand, assuming Asaad is historically informed and well understands that the U.S. policy is constitutively discriminatory, that it is based on an understanding of the prerogative of full citizenship and enfranchisement accruing only to a select constituency, defined by certain Enlightenment notions about human nature, then his remarks are terribly shrewd and even cynical. Because, on that assumption, Hamas assumes the function of delimiting the proper exercise of thinking as explicitly anti-Enlightenment. The fact that, domestically, the current U.S. administration deploys a similar anti-Enlightenment discourse—this is clear in the culture wars, where fundamentalism at home is the rallying cry, while abroad it is the enemy—underscores the shrewdness of Hamas's position. Hamas would then appear to grasp the current situation quite well and understand that the relationship signaled by the conjunction *or* in the declaration "democracy or ideology" is equivalence rather than alternative. This means that the legitimation of power is a function of power itself: whatever party successfully persuades the multitude that its way of thinking is best or the proper way to truth secures the prerogative of power. There is some warrant for this reading of Asaad's remarks, given that the occasion for them was the publication in the *New York Times* of conversations at high levels of the U.S. and Israeli governments about plans to destabilize the Hamas government

by systematically creating sufficient social unrest so that it would collapse within months. The dispute, then, is not over the conception of democracy but over the proper ideology.

Why should we concern ourselves today with an analytical concept whose inadequacy in doing the very thing it sets out to do, namely, explain the dynamics of social change, has been long established? After all, ideology was first pronounced dead—at least in the United States—at the height of the cold war in 1960 by the staunchly anticommunist liberal Daniel Bell. Even earlier, from a different, so-called neutralist, perspective on the political spectrum, the Frankfurt School—chiefly Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer—had in 1944 assessed that the fetishization of pure facts under the American system was achieving a commodification of consciousness so absolute that the possibility to recognize it as ideological was diminishing. This Adorno/Horkheimer judgment was later reiterated, or at least supported, in the 1970s in Louis Althusser's structuralist equating of ideology with idealism, against which he posed science/materialism as an antidote working toward the death of ideology—both in the absolutist scientism of his method as well as that method's function. Nor did poststructuralism find anything worthy in reviving ideology even as an analytical category. It was dismissed as not existing by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari in 1980. Ideology was finally declared defunct with the utmost of authoritative certainty at the end of the cold war in 1989 by Francis Fukuyama, who, writing from the U.S. State Department as a recognized Straussian, asserted in what was then a widely acclaimed essay, "The End of History," that the then imminent collapse of Soviet communism meant that reason had fulfilled itself in the world through the agencies of U.S. cultural hegemony so that there simply was no other viable cosmology available to humankind than that of liberal free-market democracy. Fukuyama has recently claimed, in a *New York Times Magazine* piece, that the correct reading of the essay in its extended 1992 book version is as a Marxist argument for the existence of a long-term process of social evolution, terminating in liberal democracy rather than communism; this is now to be understood as a contradiction to the maximalist (read Leninist) neoconservatist position of Richard Perle, Robert Kagan, and Paul Wolfowitz.[3] All this taken into account, across a significantly broad political spectrum of Western civilization—with the predictable, and generally unnoticeable, exception of ardent, mainly English-language Marxist theorists, driven into the recesses of academic cultural studies—the assess-

3. Francis Fukuyama, "After Neoconservatism," *New York Times Magazine*, February 19, 2006.

ment was that ideology was dead. Even continued deployment of ideology as a category of analysis by social science—the recent work of Graham Kinloch and Raj Mohan is a good example of this—treats it as a set or pattern of behavior completely within the ambit of a global rationalism. It is examined either in terms of the limitations and uncritical presumptions of methodologies—this is the perennial problem of the relationship between particulars and the universal—or as reactionary responses to the globalization of rationalism. All of which is to suggest that any concern we might have with the topic of ideology is purely academic.

Events of the past sixteen months or so, specifically a series of rather spectacular statements offered by U.S. president George W. Bush, and British prime minister Tony Blair in the immediate aftermath of the subway bombings in London, England, on July 7 and 26, 2005, offer clear evidence to the contrary. Even before those horrendous happenings, there was a tendency noticeable in numerous remarks appearing in publications across the full spectrum of U.S. politics, from the now Nixon Center–dominated *In the National Interest* to *Dissent Magazine*, suggesting ideology's resurrection in the guise of Islamist totalitarianism as an explanation of what drives terrorism. The first clear public testimony to this resurrection as a statement of policy came on June 28, 2005, in a speech given by President Bush, at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, just ten days before the July 7 bombings, which would become the latest in a series of massive, near-catastrophic bombings.

Barely more than a year prior to the London bombings, on March 11, 2004, the commuter train system in Madrid, Spain, was bombed. This attack was preceded seven months earlier by the bombing of the U.N. headquarters in Baghdad, Iraq, on August 20, 2003, during the early days of the Iraqi insurgency against the U.S. occupation. The Baghdad UN headquarters bombing was itself preceded by a series of bombings on May 16, 2003, in Casablanca, Morocco. Prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, bombings occurred on the island of Bali on October 12, 2002, and at a synagogue in Djerba, Tunisia, on April 11, 2002, which was just seven months after the destruction of the World Trade Center in New York City on September 11, 2001. Going back even earlier, the USS *Cole* was attacked on October 12, 2000, and the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salem, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya, were bombed on August 7, 1998. Before June 28, 2005, all these events were described by the Bush administration as part of a sustained campaign of terror being waged by al-Qaʿida to drive the U.S. military out of the region of the Middle East and to undermine existing governments in the region, chiefly

the Saudis. None of these attacks occasioned a public testimony of ideology's resurrection. Even in the declaration of the global war on terror consequent to the 9/11 bombings, which was colored with considerable commentary about the repressive nature of the Taliban regime and the role played by the Saudi exportation of Wahhabism, there was no invocation of ideology. And as far as the occupation of Iraq was concerned, the Bush administration took great care to insist that the insurgency had no political agenda other than disruption and no clear ideological goals to warrant characterizing them as being driven by ideology. The struggle was presented in terms of moral absolutes: good against consummate evil; democratic liberty and freedom against Islamist tyranny and terrorism. The account changed in a significant way in June 2005 at Fort Bragg.

What seems to have occasioned the Fort Bragg testimony of ideology's resurrection was an effort to recalibrate the government's explanation of why the United States invaded Iraq in order to address growing public dissatisfaction. As reflected in recent polls, 68 percent of the American public have begun to question the wisdom of entering into the Iraq War in the first place and are dissatisfied with the way the war is being conducted, thinking it is making the United States more rather than less vulnerable to terrorist assault at home. Accordingly, the invocation of ideology in the Fort Bragg speech was meant to provide a bridge connecting terrorism in general—it must be noted that in that speech Bush never uses the designator *Islamist* or *Islamic extremism*, just *terrorism*—with the Iraqi insurgency. Political expediency is what brought President Bush to assert that the Iraqi insurgency and al-Qaʿida share a "totalitarian ideology that hates freedom, rejects tolerance, and despises all dissent." The president reinforced the ideological bridge by explaining that the fighters from various Arab countries who have come to Iraq to fight the Americans do so "because," as President Bush puts it, "they know that the survival of their hateful ideology is at stake."[4]

On July 11, just ten days after the London bombings, in a speech at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia, that was planned prior to those bombings, President Bush repeated his testimony of ideology's resurrection with some significant, albeit slight, elaboration in the wake of the July 7 attack. The text of the Quantico speech is remarkable for its force and succinctness in expressing abstractions, specifically the abstraction of terrorism's ideology. "We don't know who committed the attacks in London," Presi-

4. George W. Bush (speech, Fort Bragg, N.C., June 28, 2005), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/06/20050628-7.html.

dent Bush asserts, "but we do know that terrorists celebrate the suffering of the innocent. We do know that terrorists murder in the name of a totalitarian ideology that hates freedom, rejects tolerance and despises all dissent. Their aim—the aim of the terrorists is to remake the Middle East in their own grim image of tyranny and oppression by toppling governments, by exporting terror, by forcing free nations to retreat and withdraw."[5]

The shift from admitting an absolute absence of intelligence—of course, we now know that this was an exaggeration in service of the investigation—to firm knowledge about what cause terrorists serve is abrupt and logic defying. But then, the assertion of certain knowledge on little-acknowledged intelligence (that is, verifiable evidentiary information) is a hallmark of the Bush administration. The basis or sources for knowledge are remarkably mysterious and secret with this government, which serves to give its account of ideology's resurrection an aura of the miraculous. And it is a miracle to be witnessed but revealed subjectively. Unlike the public testimony of Christ's resurrection, which was an eyewitness account of the event—that of ideology's is a matter of personal revelation. It is a revelation that, given how it proceeds to contradict the earlier held staunch position that no ideology was there—which, as will be accounted for later, was a derivative stance from a more fundamental neoconservative proposition that after 1989 no ideology was possible at all—bears a notable resemblance to the personal revelation on the road to Damascus that converted Saul the prosecutor to Paul the apostle. And as in the case of Paul's revelation of the truth of Christ's resurrection, Bush's revelation of the truth of ideology's resurrection is salvation. In ideology's resurrection is the salvation of the Iraq War, the war on terror, as well as President Bush's legacy. And so, the account of just what has been resurrected is duly dramatic and properly reverential of the divinity at play, which, when we turn our full attention to the Quantico speech, we learn is freedom and democracy.

> In the war on terror, Iraq is now a central front. The terrorists fight in Iraq because they know that the survival of their hateful—hateful ideology is at stake. They know that as freedom takes root in Iraq, it will inspire millions across the Middle East to claim their liberty, as well. And when the Middle East grows in democracy and prosperity and hope, the terrorists will lose their sponsors. They'll lose their recruits.

5. George W. Bush (speech, FBI Academy, Quantico, Va., July 11, 2005), http://usinfo.state.gov/sa/Archive/2005/Jul/11-581813.html?chanlid=sa.

> They will lose their hopes for turning that region into a base of attacks against America and our allies. . . .
>
> The heart of our strategy is this: Free societies are peaceful societies. So in the long run, the only way to defeat the ideologies of hatred and fear, the only way to make sure our country is secure in the long run, is to advance the cause of freedom.
>
> We have seen freedom conquer evil and secure the peace before. In World War II, free nations came together to fight the ideology of fascism, and freedom prevailed. And today Germany and Japan are allies in securing the peace. In the Cold War, freedom defeated the ideology of communism and led to a Europe whole, free and at peace.
>
> Today in the Middle East freedom is once again contending with an ideology that seeks to sow anger and hatred and despair. And like fascism and communism before, the hateful ideologies that use terror will be defeated by the unstoppable power of freedom and democracy.

The description of the nature of ideology is sweeping in its open-endedness, on the verge of lacking any true distinction. It is hateful, evil, totalitarian, and most of all analogous to fascism and communism. In contrast, the description of what opposes it, what has always historically successfully opposed it, is more specific and focused: the unstoppable *power* of freedom and democracy. It is not the abstraction of freedom itself—which in any event, for Bush, is not an idea but a divine gift to all humanity—or even the various institutions of liberal democracy. That which always defeats ideology is power.

This explicitly made hard distinction between nebulous ideology and distinctive power prompts a couple of pertinent questions. But before engaging these questions, we need to give some attention to another detail that bears heavily on their pertinence concerning the context of the Fort Bragg and Quantico speeches. Speaking at the retirement ceremony of Admiral Vern Clark as chief of naval operations in Annapolis, Maryland, on July 22, eleven days after President Bush's Quantico speech, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld used the phrase "the global struggle against the enemies of freedom, the enemies of civilization."[6] A few days later, on Monday, July 25, General Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the National Press Club that he had "objected to the use of the

6. Donald Rumsfeld (speech, Naval Academy, Annapolis, Md., July 22, 2005), http://www.pentagon.gov/speeches/2005/sp20050722-secdef1781.html.

term 'war on terrorism' before, because if you call it a war, then you think of people in uniform as being the solution." While acknowledging that the armed forces were heavily involved now, Myers insisted that "future efforts require[d] all instruments of our national power, all instruments of the international communities' national power," because "the solution is more diplomatic, more economic, more political than it is military." The next day, the *New York Times* reported on these remarks by Rumsfeld and Myers as indicators of a policy shift that had been under discussion in the administration for some eighteen months, in which it was decided by the president's senior advisors to abandon the phrase "war on terror" for "global struggle against violent extremism" (G-SAVE). This was supposed to be a significant policy shift from the unilateral take-no-prisoners approach to the al-Qa'ida threat as best addressed militarily in terms of asymmetrical force, to a more multilateral cooperation with other nations that recognizes al-Qa'ida as symptomatic of a broader, less-defined sociopolitical danger, suggesting "the idea that the long-term struggle is as much an ideological battle as a military mission," to quote anonymous senior officials cited by the *Times*.[7] It seems, though, that this move was under way in the Defense Department since May 2005, which suggests that President Bush's invocation of ideology in his Fort Bragg and Quantico speeches was a reflection of this policy shift. But it was a shift that almost no one was prepared to take too seriously as anything but a rhetorical turn meant to tone down the bellicosity that had begun to turn the electorate against Bush's Iraq War policy while still declaring success and continued commitment to the overall agenda.

Writing about what was the then recent circulation of G-SAVE in his *New York Times* column on August 1, 2005, Paul Krugman remarked that the apparent floundering of the administration's policy agenda was of no moment, because the one agenda it "has always taken with utmost seriousness—consolidating one-party rule, and rewarding its friends" is a political not a policy, agenda, and is right on track.[8] The charge of waffling on foreign policy for the sake of political expediency seemed to be confirmed by President Bush's speech to the American Legislative Exchange Council in Grape-

7. See Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, "Bombings in London: Hearts and Minds; New Name for 'War on Terror' Reflects Wider U.S. Campaign," *New York Times*, July 26, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/26/politics/26strategy.html?ei=5090&en=22b94b0298c1ca6a&ex=1280030400&partner=rssuserland&emc=rss&pagewanted=print.

8. Paul Krugman, "Triumph of the Machine," *New York Times*, August 1, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/01/opinion/01krugman.html?ex=1280548800&en=df3f3981de68793e&ei=5090&partner=rssuserland&emc=rss.

vine, Texas, on August 3, two days after the Krugman column appeared, in which he not only carefully repeated the phrase "war on terror" but also insisted that there should be no mistake that we are indeed at war. Yet, this reiteration and insistence was done while also repeating the very descriptions of ideology used in the Quantico speech. Iraq is again described as "the latest battlefield in the war on terror," where non-Iraqi fighters are flocking to fight American forces because they understand that "a democracy in the heart of the Middle East will be a major blow to their desire to spread an ideology that's hateful and dark and negative." In the Texas speech, the struggle against ideology is expressly described as an aspect of the overall war effort rather than a shift of policy. "We have done this type of work before in our nation," Bush told his Texas audience. "We have fought evil before. We have been through ideological struggles. Your dads and granddads fought against the Nazis and fought against the Japanese. It was an ideological struggle against an enemy that was ruthless. And we prevailed. We prevailed in more ways than one. We prevailed militarily, but we also helped spread democracy. We laid that foundation for peace for the next generation coming up."[9]

There is some evidence, however, that the reputed policy shift is more than just one of political expediency. The language of the president's Texas speech echoes statements he made just a year earlier, on August 6, 2004, when his standing in the polls on the Iraq War was considerably stronger, at the Unity Journalists of Color Convention in Washington, D.C. This was not the usual audience of the already-converted that President Bush is accustomed to speaking before, and its pronounced critical attitude toward his policy, both foreign and domestic, was evident in the question-and-answer period following his prepared remarks. This was an unusual extended period of unscripted talk from Mr. Bush, during which a particularly revealing comment came in response to his being asked to state just what the mission in Iraq is and how we will know it is accomplished, in light of General Tommy Franks's published statements conservatively estimating that two to four more years of a large-scale American presence would be required. At first the president stayed close to script, giving the familiar response that "the mission is for . . . there to be a democratic Iraq, where they have elections to elect their government," the tactics for which are to "provide security to the Allawi government as they move toward elections." But then he made

9. George W. Bush (speech, American Legislative Exchange Council, Grapevine, Tex., August 3, 2005), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/08/20050803.html.

a startling admission. After characterizing the insurgency as "people [who] don't like freedom . . . [b]ecause it clashes with their ideology"—this is what the 2005 Texas speech echoes—he then said, "We actually misnamed the war on terror, it ought to be the struggle against ideological extremists who do not believe in free societies who happen to use terror as a weapon to try to shake the conscience of the free world."[10]

It would appear, then, there has been an investment of some sort in testifying to ideology's resurrection for a while in the Bush administration. If we go by the public record, that effort had been under way for at least a year prior to the July London bombings, the actual moment of the event of resurrection remaining obscure throughout that time. Yet, throughout all the efforts in public testimony—most notably those occurring in the first three months immediately after the bombings—there is nothing to suggest the issue of conceptual contestation. In spite of the repeated references to freedom and democracy, there is not even the slightest consideration that ideology indicates valid differences in thinking about the world. What is clear is that the policy shift is, rather, an expansion of the conflict to a new front, without downgrading the military campaign. And as with the military campaign, it is a struggle of asymmetrical forces. Ideology is the extremist politics of the weak against the powerful. In fact, the Quantico speech expressly states that ideology indicates the invalid hate of power.

If ideology's nature is described as hateful hate, the opposite of which is power, then we are invited to ponder just what is the relationship between the hateful and power. Does power transcend hate? Is it the case that to hate power is to be ideological? These questions approach the plot—in the narrow, critical sense of the term, not the popular usage—of Bush's testimony of the resurrection: determining absolutely what is the proper relationship to power. The administration's theory of power is well enough known—there is no need to elaborate on it at length here. There is an aspect of it, however, that bears heavily on the issue at hand, that is, its studied counter-liberalism. Against classical liberalism's conception of power stemming from the well-managed reconciliation of disparate interests through consensus and compromise, the Bush administration defines power—and this is a definition that falls firmly within the conceptual framework that led President Theodore Roosevelt to launch the Great White Fleet on its circumnaviga-

10. George W. Bush (speech, Unity Journalists of Color Convention, Washington, D.C., August 6, 2004), http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/stories.pl?ACCT=109&STORY=/www/story/08-06-2004/0002226945&EDATE=.

tion of the globe in 1909—as a monopoly of the means of coercion. The strong tendency of this theory of power is to construe criticism of power as not only hateful and so ideology, but as inevitably doomed. The power of freedom and democracy, then, requires the annihilation of criticism. The response of British prime minister Tony Blair's Labor government to the London bombings of July 7, 2005, is a suitable case study of this proposition readily at hand.

The stated topic of Prime Minister Blair's first public speech on the bombings, which he gave on July 16—nine days after the bombings, but just five days after Bush's Quantico speech—was to "face up to the nature of the threat we are dealing with." The prime minister does not so much define the threat as to name it, and with that naming testifies to ideology's resurrection. "What we are confronting here," Blair states, referring to the July 7 bombings as a battle in the global war on terror, "is an evil ideology."[11] The London bombings shattered an illusion that had gained considerable vividness after September 11, 2001, namely, that the preferred weapon of the Islamist terrorist, suicide bombers, was the expression of a way of life that is consummately alien to Western civilization.

A presumption long generally held—in fact, asserted by a wide range of public figures from the Dalai Lama to President Bush—is that suicide bombers are the product of poverty and despair resulting from uneven development in mainly the Third World. This view was challenged in 2004, when Professor Alberto Abadie, of Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, published the results of his empirical study of the causes of terrorism. His findings were that terrorist violence is related to a nation's level of political freedom, rather than economics. More precisely, that terrorism is most prevalent in those situations where a country is in transition from an autocratic regime to democracy. The prime case for this being Sri Lanka, where the Tamil Tigers carry the distinction of world leader in a number of terrorist attacks; indeed, they are known to have invented the use of the suicide-bomber vest in the 1991 assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, which Hamas later emulated. A more recent theory, that of Robert Pape, of the University of Chicago, who has compiled the most extensive database so far of suicide-terrorist attacks around the world from 1980 to early 2004, including Arabic, Hebrew, Russian, and Tamil sources, postulates that "overwhelmingly suicide-terrorist attacks are not driven by religion as much as they are by a clear strategic objective: to compel modern democracies to with-

11. Tony Blair (speech, Labour Party National Conference, London, July 16, 2005), http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4689363.stm.

draw military forces from the territory that the terrorists view as their homeland.[12] In other words, suicide bombings are a direct result of foreign invasion and occupation. According to Pape's data, 95 percent of suicide-bombing incidents have as their central objective to compel a democratic state to withdraw. Pape emphatically interprets his findings to directly contradict the theory that suicide bombings stem from the rejection of Western civilization or from religious zeal, pointing out not only that the Tamil Tigers are a secular Marxist entity but that during the period from 1995 to 2004, two-thirds of al-Qaʿida's suicide bombers came from countries where the United States has stationed heavy combat troops since 1990, and not from strongly Islamist states such as Sudan and Iran. According to the numbers in both Abadie's and Pape's empirically based studies, ideological fervor is not the determinate cause of these attacks.

These statistics-based theories suffered a tremendous blow with the London bombings on July 7, 2005. The problem was not the inadequacy of their profiles. All four of the suspected July 7 bombers were of solid petit-bourgeoisie background, and the stated objective was to force Britain out of Iraq—Blair's insistence, in response to the Chatham House report linking the bombing to his Iraq War policy, is of no moment in this regard, except as obvious political damage control. The challenge presented by the London bombings derives from one simple indisputable fact: all four bombers were British born and British raised. It is the second part of that which is most vexing. As second-generation immigrants, they were all raised in Britain, with demonstrably strong British affinities. Frequent reference was made to the fact that one of the bombers was an ardent cricket fan. An even stronger indication of the London terrorists' Britishness surfaced in the course of the investigation with the discovery in Peshawar, Pakistan, of the diary of Zeeshan Siddique, whom the British investigators suspected was connected with the July 7 bombings.[13] In his diary, Siddique, who was raised in the London suburb of Hounslow, calls London the "vital organ of the minions of the devil." The thirty-five-page text is also sprinkled with British slang, profanities, and verses from the Koran. There is a keen sense of alienation and, at times, antipathy toward the Pakistanis among whom he is living, as demon-

12. "The Logic of Suicide Terrorism: It's the Occupation, not the Fundamentalism," interview with Robert Pape in *The American Conservative*, July 18, 2005, http://www.amconmag.com/2005_07_18/article.html.

13. David Rohde and Mohammed Khan, "Ex-Londoner's Diary of Jihad: A Portrait Sprinkled with Koran Verses and Epithets," *New York Times*, August 8, 2005, http://select.nytimes.com/search/restricted/article?res=F70F17FD3C5A0C7B8CDDA10894DD404482.

strated in the following entry from March 8, 2005: "I can't live in filth unlike u animals." He refers to his Pakistani neighbors as "dirty geezers" and a Pakistani store owner as a "monkey con artist." He complains about the lack of modern facilities in his hideaway, particularly the lack of running water, as well as feeling acutely isolated because he could not speak the local language, writing on March 10 that he is "constantly laughed at & ridiculed." Siddique's diary is offered as direct evidence of the extent to which the London terrorists were not only more British than anything else but were utterly alien to the countries of their parents' origin. Their actions cannot be adequately explained, then, in the quasi-nationalist terms of Pape's study. The commitment is to something far more abstract than the specified political objective to force the withdrawal of British troops. The diary gives a fair portrait of the radical Islamist way Siddique views the world—he rails about Pakistanis who "claim 2 b Muslim" but "don't get it thru there thik heads that it is their fard, or religious duty, to help him wage his holy war"—but it offers little to no account of how or why he transformed from an ordinary average student at Cranford Community College in Hounslow from September 1992 to July 1997 into a radical Islamist terrorist.

If we grant that Abadie's and Pape's findings are based on statistical analysis of a compiled, albeit immensely vast, database, it may simply be the case that the July 7 London bombings are the exception that proves the rule, and perhaps can be accounted for in terms of a transnational antipathy toward democratic rule even within democratic society itself. This in itself would be nothing new. Lest we forget, before 9/11 the worst incident of domestic terrorism in the United States was the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, in 1995, which was carried out by right-wing fascists who were native U.S. citizens. As in the case of the Oklahoma terrorists, an adequate account of the emergence of homegrown London terrorists could be achieved through an elaboration of the structuralist tendencies suggested in Abadie's and Pape's studies, adding in such variables as racial discrimination and the devastating effects of neoliberal economics on quotidian urban life. Both of these factors were considered in *The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain: The Parekh Report*, published in 2000, which was strongly rejected by Blair's government because it suggested that language and symbols of Englishness and Britishness have a racial connotation that made them synonymous with whiteness.[14] This reaction was

14. Compare Paul Gilroy, *Postcolonial Melancholia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), xi–xvi.

on a par with the overall rejection of multiculturalism as an identity politics that was corroding the fabric of society, undermining the discourse of individual rights in an open society in favor of group (ethnic, religious, racial) rights in a more closed-off society of competing collective interests. *The Parekh Report* did not argue anything like that. Instead, it sought to describe how the increasing participation of immigrant populations in British democratic society had fostered increased expectations of individual freedoms and rights among the children of those immigrants—they were British in formation—but that the residual structural racialism of the society was frustrating fulfillment of those expectations. The point was that this failure to fully integrate immigrant populations, the vast majority of which are Muslim, was a problem of justice and equality that posed a serious threat to society.

In some sense, this is the gist of what Abadie's findings suggest, echoing Joseph Schumpeter's earlier insight that where mass expectations of equitability rise but those expectations go unfulfilled—his example was Asia in the 1930s—radical chiliasm—his example was communism—appears as the only plausible solution. Schumpeter recognized this to be a constitutive tendency of modernity (bear in mind that communism's unwavering belief in the imminent massive transformation of society carries an Anabaptist genealogy). At first, in his July 16 speech, Blair seems to remark the internal, or constitutive, nature of the threat, rejecting the Huntington clash of civilization model. "It is not a clash of civilisations," the prime minister asserts. [A]ll civilised people, Muslim or other, feel revulsion at it. But it is a global struggle and it is a battle of ideas, hearts and minds, both within Islam and outside it." The inclusion of Islam within civilization is expedient, and not just imperial. The problem of integration is recognized as global. A linkage is established between the political problem of integrating Islam into Europe—that is, the problem of Turkey, but also the decade-old Euro-Mediterranean Partnership—and the social problem of integrating Muslims into European society as Europeans. Of course, Blair's enunciation of Islam's incorporation into civilization does not even resolve rhetorically either of these problems. In fact, it is contradicted by what he utters next: "This is the battle that must be won, a battle not just about the terrorist methods but their views. Not just their barbaric acts, but their barbaric ideas. Not only what they do but what they think and the thinking they would impose on others." We are shifting grounds here, in the course of which the problem of unfulfilled expectations generated by the problems of equitability and justice inherent in modernity is quietly set aside for a way of thinking that

on July 16 is not altogether alien, but the worst sort of evil; and it is here that ideology is resurrected. "The 20th century showed how powerful political ideologies could be," Prime Minister Blair reminds us. "This is a religious ideology," he then states, referring to the Islamism of the London bombers. "[It is] a strain within the worldwide religion of Islam, as far removed from its essential decency and truth as Protestant gunmen who kill Catholics or vice versa, are from Christianity. But do not let us underestimate it or dismiss it."

It is not Islamist terrorism that is the threat, it is Islamism as a way of thinking. More specifically, the threat of Islamism is that it is ideology and not true religion. And, as Blair succinctly put it on July 16,

> In the end, it is by the power of argument, debate, true religious faith and true legitimate politics that we will defeat this threat.
>
> That means not just arguing against their terrorism, but their politics and their perversion of religious faith. It means exposing as the rubbish it is, the propaganda about America and its allies wanting to punish Muslims or eradicate Islam.
>
> It means championing our values of freedom, tolerance and respect for others. It means explaining why the suppression of women and the disdain for democracy are wrong.
>
> The idea that elected governments are the preserve of those of any other faith or culture is insulting and wrong. Muslims believe in democracy just as much as any other faith and, given the chance, show it.

Prime Minister Blair is not *merely* echoing President Bush's Quantico speech. He is, indeed, offering more than Bush did; he offers something of a conceptual elaboration of the nature of ideology itself as a threat to civilization. Whereas Bush's account of the resurrection implies a struggle against critical thinking under the banner of a global struggle against violent extremism, Blair's account works to rescue critical thinking, of a sort, by identifying it with rationalism and designating ideology as that which is inherently antirational, if not irrational, and must be annihilated for the sake of civilization. The strategy of annihilation was laid out three weeks later on August 5, at the prime minister's monthly Downing Street press conference. Announcing that there should not be "any doubt [that] the rules of the game are changing," Blair unveiled an executive counterterrorism plan. The plan consisted of twelve points:

1. Introduce new grounds for deporting and excluding people from the UK
2. Amend human rights laws, if necessary, to prevent legal obstacles to new deportation rules
3. Home secretary automatically to consider deporting any foreigner involved in listed extremist bookshops, centers, organizations, and Web sites
4. Make justifying or glorifying terrorism anywhere an offense
5. Automatically refuse asylum to anyone having anything to do with terrorism
6. Set a maximum time limit for extraditions to other countries
7. Examine calls for police to be able to hold terror suspects for longer before pressing charges
8. Use more control orders against British terror suspects
9. Increase the number of special judges hearing terror cases
10. Ban the Hizb-ut-Tahrir and Al-Muhajiroun organizations—and successor groups
11. Review the threshold for gaining British citizenship
12. Create a list of preachers who will be kept out of the UK, and use biometric visas for those from designated countries

Of these twelve, points 2, 3, 4, and 10 generated considerable anxiety among civil libertarians and carried the full freight of the prime minister's assertion that the rules of the game have changed. The controversy about point 2 concerns explicit European Union constitutional bans against knowingly deporting someone to a country where they will be tortured. The power of deportation proposed in point 3 is not just the clear criminalization of thinking and speech, but the vagueness of the language gives the home secretary virtually unlimited power to unilaterally determine what is extremist thought and speech. The equally vague, open-ended language of point 4 further empowers the home secretary to criminalize any statement regarding any actions of political violence of which the government does not approve. As Ken Roth, executive director of Human Rights Watch, remarked regarding this point, "[I]f I were to say, 'You know, I think that it was appropriate for the pre-Israel Jewish underground to bomb the King David Hotel [in 1946] as a way of gaining Israel's independence,' I would have committed a crime in Tony Blair's UK."[15] By the same token, no utterance of

15. "Britain Detains Foreign Radicals," *Lehrer News Hour*, August 11, 2005.

support, whether public or private, for the current Palestinian intifada would be allowed. In evidence to support the validity of these concerns, point 10 singles out an established political organization with a long-demonstrated record of nonviolence and opposition to terrorist violence for banning. The charge against Hizb-ut-Tahrir is that it aggressively advocates for the establishment of an international caliphate in the Muslim world, which, presumably, violates what Prime Minister Blair describes in his July 16 speech as "expressing extremist views that conflict with Britain's culture of tolerance." Once again, Roth points out the expansive powers that the proposed language would give British police: "Britain is known for the rights that it gives gays and lesbians. If I were to come in and say, 'I think that the gay lifestyle is wrong,' that would be expressing a view that is incompatible with Britain's culture of tolerance, and I would have committed a crime, at least conceivably." "Staying here carries with it a duty," Mr. Blair maintains. "That duty is to share and support the values that sustain the British way of life. Those that break that duty and try to incite hatred or engage in violence against our country and its people have no place here."[16] As it turned out, the proposed changes in deportation and incarceration were defeated in Parliament, but the House of Commons passed the language criminalizing the "glorification" of terrorism in February 2006. These political details taken into account, the crucial thing to consider is that Blair is not just distinguishing between true religious belief as a private affair and religious ideology as a threat to civilization; he presents ideology as an alien element, an infection from without that requires draconian measures of inoculation and treatment.

The distinction Blair makes between evil religious ideology—Islamism—and true Islamic religious faith, which he stresses believes in democracy, too, suggests a reformation of Islam that will bring it fully within the sphere of classical liberal cosmology. This brings to the fore the problem of alienation. Given that there is nothing that essentially precludes Islam from liberal democracy, and also that all the suspects of both the July 7 and the failed July 26 bombings were demonstrably British in their formation, why, then, were they so alienated from liberal democracy that they actively participated in violent efforts to undermine it? Adequately addressing such a question requires taking the problem of alienation to be a function of material social conditions. Its resolution necessitates dynamic social change in opposition to the status quo. This was the finding of *The Parekh*

16. Tony Blair, Prime Minister's Press Conference, London, August 5, 2005, http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page8041.asp.

Report, whose analysis of structural racialism Blair's government vehemently rejected. The problem of alienation is recast as a failure of integration. More precisely, it is the failure of Muslims to be fully integrated into liberal democracy. In concert with the draconian measures of inoculation, the prime minister proposes a commission charged with advising how people can be allowed to follow their own religion and culture while also being better integrated. It would also look at reaching those who are currently "inadequately integrated."[17]

Not only is the problem of alienation transformed into that of "inadequate" integration, but the problem of integration as a function of material social conditions is itself elided and bureaucratized. Once again, the move here is to assert that the crisis does not rest within Europe or liberal democracy but belongs to Islam as a set or constellation of ideas that "interferes" with integration. The bureaucratic nature of the solution, which makes it wholly a matter of political management, focuses attention sharply on the public function of these ideas rather than their face value. That focus is highly inconsistent, however. Treating Islamism as ideology works with the conception that ideas have a reflective relation to interests. Specifically, it is to think that the ideas of Islamism—explicitly, those of Sayyid Qutb—have assumed practical import only because they have taken hold in a discernible group. This is the familiar Marxist axiom that ideas become material forces as soon as they take hold of the masses. That axiom presumes a historical material process of social formation in which collective aggregates are assembled with interests, interests that are themselves a function of that process. If Islamism is alien to the process of liberal democracy and society, then what process does its ideology reflect? The most likely candidate is globalization. But if that were so, then how do we account for the distinction between good Muslim and bad Muslim? Are not both categories of the class Muslim? And if so, then how is that class a function of the process of globalization?

Olivier Roy, of the CNRS (the French National Center for Scientific Research), offers a way of accounting for this by analyzing Islamism as a tendency of globalization that attends the rapid annihilation of traditional societal forms under capital over the past one hundred years.[18] In this sense, Islamists are anti-imperialist. It is not so much the case that capitalist imperialism produced a disjunction between the set of ideas that legitimated specific elites as essential to managing power—in the case of Sunni Islam, this

17. Blair, Prime Minister's Press Conference, August 5, 2005.
18. Olivier Roy, *L'Islam mondialisé* (Paris: Édition du Seuil, 2002).

would be the *ʿulema*, or specialized intellectuals of religious thought, including the jurist, and for Shiʿa Islam the Ayatollahs—and the social formations emerging in globalization. Rather, Roy postulates, globalization produced the conditions for the absolute deterritorialization of religiosity, which fostered a transnational virtual *umma*. Let us leave aside for the moment the important fact that historically the *umma*—even when deployed by the Abbasid state to legitimate its claims to absolute power in the eighth century CE—has always been virtual. Roy explains Islamism to be the by-product of a transnational cosmopolitan class of alienated "Westernized" elites from Muslim countries produced in the historical process of capitalist modernity—in this sense Islamism resembles the demagogic right-wing extremism that emerged in Europe in the wake of World War I as a consequence of the dissolution of the structures of power instituted after the bourgeoisie revolutions of 1848. Roy's explanation reiterates the danger of ethics' relation to politics in such critical junctures described by Max Weber in 1919.[19] In this reiteration, the Islamists appear to be adherents of an absolutist ethics: ethics as goal and purpose. Such a concept presumes the identification of ethics and politics, so that the entirety of society must conform—which itself implies the homogenization of society, which might indeed be understood as the displacement of society (*mujtamiʿah*) with community (*umma*). Because it must deny the legitimacy of any social existence other than it, the resulting community is necessarily totalitarian. Roy's analysis begs two crucial questions, however.

In the first instance, he presumes to treat the traditional Islamic elites—the aforementioned *ʿulema* and Ayatollah—as formations alien to the process of modernity. This means that the so-called good Muslims are an alien formation to globalization, that is, they are premodern—a supposition unsubstantiated by any rigorous historical analysis. Once they are conceived of in this way, the challenge becomes to integrate them into the process of modernity without jeopardizing the integrity of that process. This has been the explicit objective of the fifteen-year-old state-supported effort in France and Germany to create a European Islam in accordance with the Enlightenment's depoliticization of religion. This is a specious agenda for numerous reasons, not the least of which is that the actual formation of Muslims, not only in Europe but worldwide, for the past two hundred years, has been fully within the ambit of capitalist modernity. It is not just that tradition-

19. Max Weber, "Politik als Beruf," *Gesammelte Politische Schriften* (München, n.p., 1921), 396–450. Lecture originally given at the University of Munich in 1918.

alists since al-Afghani, Muhammad ʿAbduh, and even ʿAbd-ul-Wahab have confronted liberalism as well as scientism in their formulations of Islamist thought and action—in the case of ʿAbduh, this is *Salafiya*, and that of ʿAbd-ul-Wahab, *Wahabiya*—but even the disparate popular formations that have erupted and waned in the course of the past two centuries have done so in the glare of capitalist colonialism and imperialism. This raises the second problem with Roy's analysis. Treating Islamism as a function of modernity's globalization requires an account of class formation—in the specific sense of aggregation—in terms other than economic relationship to the modes of production. The most likely candidate is precisely the racialism that *The Parekh Report* cited. Nor will it do to simply treat racialism as a false consciousness deployed in the interests of the capitalist and bourgeoisie classes. Even though that might explain why the proletarian is inclined toward the ideology, it does not account for the difference in material formation between the urban proletarian and the urban *evolué*.

As the historian Marcus Rediker has shown in his work on the formation of labor class consciousness in the Atlantic sphere that was the epicenter of mercantilism and capitalism, the tendency of those respective political economies to organize human life into forms of energy that are manageable within an economy of force is a chief feature, if not defining aspect, of capitalist modernity. So that the pertinence of this is clearer, take note of Roy's account of Islamism as an absolutist ethics necessitating a totalitarian community. Capitalist modernity cannot abide such totalitarianism because a requisite for the perpetual expansion and flow of the market is the imposition of society everywhere. Capitalist modernity annihilates communities in order to constitute free-circulating individuals that can be perpetually reassembled in a ceaselessly dynamic process into mutable populations. Marx analyzed this as a function of capitalism's tendency to annihilate societal configurations that have endured for centuries and replace them with a dynamic process of rendering life as exchangeable energy. Whereas Marx was concerned with describing the way in which transformations in political economy generated transformations in human consciousness, presuming a single population that becomes increasingly bifurcated, in describing the historical phenomenon of capitalist imperialism, one must attend to the fact that the same political economy generated distinct populations in the course of the same tendency to annihilate. In other words, the tendency of capitalism to annihilate societal configurations did not just produce the proletarian class but produced entire populations as well.

The creative destruction of community for society forecloses on the

possible identification of ethics and politics—ethics must now function as the limit, the rules of the game, guaranteeing the continued social existence of diverse populations. This distinguishing feature of modernity means that no group can impose its moral conception of the whole society through civil means. Regarding the legitimate exercise of violence to achieve its purpose—which is the classical definition of political power that still works with us—every population is powerless. It is becoming abundantly clear that the current ascendant configuration of power is the security state, and that the only "trans-population" social existence the state will permit is the market. In that configuration, the effort of any population to constitute itself as a hypersocial entity, such as the *umma*, results in a violence that destroys, or at least severely incapacitates, the social order—Algeria is a paradigmatic instance of this within recent living memory. One way to forestall such annihilation is through the generation of the facade of universal values and general interest, as in Gramsci's account of hegemony. To the extent that such universalism is conceptualized as a veneer, masking the constellation of conflicting special interests, presumed to be the true material circumstance of society—after all the universal is ultimately the hyperinflated ethics of just one specific population—it is "false consciousness," or as Marx called it, ideology. In modernity's society, ideology replaces ethics. The dire ramifications of the situation in which this sort of universalism is achieved were made manifest by the advent of fascism and the globalization of managerial regimes of governmentality by the mid-twentieth century.

Returning for a moment to Fukuyama's 1989/1992 assessment about the end of ideology I briefly referred to earlier, his argument is precisely that the victory of liberalism in the twentieth century has resulted from the expansion of market-driven modernization in the world. The underlying claim is that modernization eventually equates with modernity, which achieves the actualization of universal liberalism, not as a facade covering divergent and conflicting special interests but as the only viable system of values available to the species. Fukuyama's latest effort to distinguish between that assessment and the maximalist doctrine articulated as a principle of official U.S. foreign policy in *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*—the doctrine of preemptive war—notwithstanding, both he and *The National Security Strategy* hold the same principal premise of modernity inevitably achieving liberal democracy. This, indeed, is how the end of ideology can be announced. Were this so, then hegemony—not in the commonplace sense of domination, but in Gramsci's analytical category describing the circumstances and condition in which a particular type of conscious-

ness is disseminated and sustained globally—will have fulfilled its practical function so well it no longer requires its war apparatuses. A logical corollary to the end of ideology is necessarily the end of society. Instead of diverse populations brought into the full scope of the market with residual premarket values manifest as political interests, what Fukuyama is describing in his account of the planetary ubiquity of U.S. mass culture is the ongoing generation of populations *within* the market. In this sense, the public is a function of a complicated technology of desire that dynamically constitutes and disposes of market niches.

The recent resurrection of ideology, however, suggests that the process is not quite complete, that there are elements within the public sphere that have penetrated it from without, carrying alien values asserted as special interest. With regard to Islam, this is the problem of immigrant groups that have resisted metabolization as in-market populations—the French term of art for the process is *laïcité*. The adequate understanding of the historicality of this problem still awaits a fuller analysis of the actualities of modernity's imperialism. Such an analysis would undoubtedly account for Islamism as a function of modernity, and for Islamists as an in-market population. In which case, the resurrection of ideology does not herald the resurgence of residual premodern religious tendencies—what Blair calls religious ideology—but heralds instead the iteration of modernity's society: the new universal value and general interest is liberty equated with security, whose cost is the perpetual generation and disposal of populations in a dynamic network of evaluation. It is worthwhile to point out in passing here that there are amazing resemblances between the Muslim population that emerges in twentieth-century Europe and the Negro population of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century America. I mean precisely their constitution as an essential disposable population whose presence threatens liberal democracy. This is indicative of the tremendous force of the American system to extend itself to any and all localities on the planet.

Recognizing this about the current arrangement is not equivalent to submitting to the American economy of domination but is a key first step in achieving a thorough and adequate analysis of what the present conditions of life are around the planet. One of the most salient aspects of the American system is how it manifests itself locally—and increasingly in all localities—through the phenomenon of violence that does not operate as an exceptional event but as an ongoing instrument of subjugation in the hands of powerful economic, social, and political forces. The rate of expansion, and seemingly unavoidability, of this violence around the planet has begun to

yield a generalized condition of disposability or superfluousness for significant populations of humans. A constitutive feature of this condition is that these populations are, to paraphrase Marx, a substantial element of society that has no social or political status. Indeed, as the 2005 London bombings and French riots, as well as the global furor over the Danish cartoons demeaning the Prophet Muhammad, reveal, the occurrence of disposable populations is symptomatic of the irrelevance of the entire discourse of sovereignty to the current arrangements of power. On the political side of things, which is where Blair's project operates, the challenge has become in determining how to most effectively manage the ongoing disposability of populations—where the formal procedure endures any given group that comes to be designated as disposable. In this vein, even reconciliation efforts—such as identifying "good Muslims"—can be construed as instruments of management, because they are concerned with addressing cruelties perpetrated against populations already disposed of and not populations currently under disposal. This could best be described as "necropolitics,"[20] the advent of which may very well indicate the abandonment of all modalities of persuasion (whether reasoned argument or political parties and their instruments for securing lasting majorities) in favor of brutal coercion. Once again, we ask, Why all this talk about ideology now, then?

The sustained disposability of populations is a much more adequate explanation of the conditions conducive to global terrorism than is the currently preferred European analytical category of inadequate integration. Referring to global terrorism in this way, rather than the domestic terrorism associated with the problem of integration, makes more apparent how the already established planetary scope of neoliberalism and the nearly completed scope of the planetary security state have made the distinction of internal and external spheres of action trivial. Even Pape's statistical analysis of suicide bombings worldwide does not contradict the relevance of disposability. It is not merely U.S. military presence that incites terrorism; it is

20. Of course, this term, *necropolitics*, as well as the sense outlined here, was first elaborated by Achille Mbembe in his essay "Necropolitics," trans. Libby Meintjes, *Public Culture* 15, no. 1 (Winter 2003): 11–40, as an analytic category that might recalibrate how power is analyzed presently. Mbembe's attention is particularly held by the supposed problem of sovereignty. The sense in which the term is deployed here, while still a proposed category of analysis, gives a different emphasis on the historical constitution of the social. I wish to thank my colleague Taieb Belghazi, whose ongoing work on the question of the universal ubiquity of violence as a function of necropolitics has been even more invaluable in helping me formulate my own thinking about disposability than Mbembe's seminal work.

the fact that such presence is symptomatic of the incorporation of the entire planet into the U.S.-engendered economy of force, to use Henry Adams's euphemistic description of the Open Door policy initiated by his friend John Hay, in 1898, when he was William McKinley's secretary of state. Misconstruing the problem of disposability as that of inadequate integration, and then presenting the resolution to be increased security measures directed at the entire population and the enhanced bureaucratic management of daily life, empties the current societal crisis of the issues of justice and equality, and recasts it as one of ideological contest.

Arguably, that is the function of Blair's invocation of ideology, or rather his construing Islamism as the incarnation of ideology resurrect. To state that a particular way of representing reality is false is to maintain that there is ultimately a correct representation that corresponds to the true reality. On its own, Blair's testimony of ideology's resurrection suggests the outmoded absurdity, "false consciousness." But taken together with Bush's testimony—the resonances of these two testimonies by the leaders of the two most closely allied countries in the war on terror given within five days of each other is not merely coincidental—the overall story is arguably not about false consciousness but rather about establishing the universal, absolutely seamless regime of truth.

In that mode, ideology critique—let us not shy away from recognizing the affinity between Marx's and Blair's utilization of the concept—has a normative methodological role, which gives it a certain probative value: its deployment exhibits the current configuration of the genealogy of power. It is quite correct that attention be given to this genealogy in two ways. On the one hand, it is a matter of critical judgment. In other words, the resurrection of ideology is assessed as an instance in the fetishization of pure facts under the American system, which has accomplished the absolute commodification of consciousness described by Adorno and Horkheimer. Such an assessment entails addressing the necessity for the drive to ideology on the supposition that something of the imagination—or, to use a critical term, heroic judgment—endures. The thing is to understand this endurance as signaling the productive capacity of power's destructiveness. On the other hand, the concern is historical—probing the genealogy of the discourse of ideology will facilitate displaying its inadequacy in accounting for the very thing it presumes to designate. Nonetheless, it is with the designation *ideology* that the issue at hand announces itself: a history of the present. This is the sort of transformation, the shifting of ground, that Blair's proclamation of a change in rules exposes.

Copyright of boundary 2 is the property of Duke University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.

View publication stats